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Abstract
Background The Institute of Medicine’s 2000 report entitled To Err is Human states that as many 
as 98,000 people die each year as a result of medical error in the United States.  Subsequent 
studies indicate that this may be an underestimate. Awareness of the patient safety problem has led 
to widespread attempts to encourage quality improvement in America, from legislation requiring 
incident reporting to pay-for-performance programs. Evaluating and improving process design has 
been recognized as a critical element in improving patient safety. The Joint Commission on the 
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) recommends a technique called failure mode 
effect and criticality analysis (FMECA), which  has been widely used in improving the safety of 
medical processes.  This tool’s uses are limited because of its inability to examine the possibility of 
multiple errors occurring in a process. 
Methods Efforts were centered on the creation of a generalizable schema that could be used in 
creating models more descriptive of the possibility of multiple errors contributing to undesirable 
outcomes.  For this purpose, we used a Bayesian Network (BN) to incorporate both the process 
flow diagram and the probabilities/frequencies of various failures and their consequences for a 
given procedure.  Steps from process flow diagrams used in creating FMECAs are categorized into 
action steps and validation steps, which are organized with potential outcomes and probabilities into 
a resulting matrix that represents all possible combinations of errors as well as the probability that 
any given error (or combination of errors) will occur. The model is first used as an influence diagram 
to determine which possible branches in a chain of steps may be eliminated.  Once branches with 
higher probabilities of error are eliminated, the streamlined BN will indicate the probability that any 
outcome is reached by any combination of steps with any combination of errors. An existing 
FMECA completed for blood transfusion is used to illustrate our method.
Results The resulting model is useful for several reasons.  Decision analysis can be performed to 
ascertain what potential errors can simply be eliminated from the process.  High probability errors 
are noticeable, but more importantly, dangerous combinations of error are highlighted.  Depending 
on the level of specificity achieved in the initial FMECA, specific health outcomes can be attached to 
specific errors, creating a diagnostic tool for use in later root-cause analyses.  The model can be 
adjusted readily, so proposed changes in the process can be examined in a hypothetical setting 
before being tested in an actual health care setting.
Conclusion Creation of a BN model increases the value of time intensive labor already performed 
during FMECAs.  This method shares some of the benefits of more sophisticated modeling 
approaches but builds off of the widely used FMECA framework already recommended by JCAHO.  
It achieves the goal of determining which combinations of error lead to undesired outcomes.  
Existing work on the process of completing a blood transfusion was used as an example of our method’s utility.  
The above process flowchart illustrates the steps which must occur during a blood transfusion.  This diagram was 
elicited from personnel in an unnamed hospital as an initial step in the FMECA.  
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Step ID Step Success 
Criteria
Failure 
Mode
Cause Frequency 
Category
Consequence 
Category
Safeguard 
Category
Comments Risk
5.10 Document 
results in 
computer or 
on 
downtime 
log
Correct 
cross match
Enter 
incorrect 
information
Human 
error, 
interruptions
F1 CP4 S5 Computer or 
log entry 
triggers 
blood 
issuance
High
5.11 Print or 
handwrite 
cross match 
results on 
blood unit 
tag in lab
Document 
correct 
patient and 
blood type
Incorrect or 
illegible 
handwritten 
label
Human error F2 CP1 S2 Only make 
hand-written 
labels 
during 
computer 
down time 
(<1% of 
time). If 
information 
is wrong, 
blood 
specimen 
armband on 
patient will 
catch error
Low
5.12 Attach 
printed or 
hand-written 
blood unit 
tag to donor 
blood and 
Fenwal # 
sticker
Correct tag 
on correct 
unit
Put wrong 
tag on unit
Processing 
multiple 
units at one 
time
F2 CP3 S2 Later, the 
Red Cross 
Label will 
be checked 
against the 
unit tag
Med
This table is a portion of the FMECA worksheet completed in 
conjunction with the process flowchart.  F1 and F2 stand for “Less 
than once a year” and “Once a year” respectively; the highest 
frequency category, F4, stands for “Once a week”. These 
frequencies can be transformed into numerical values which are 
entered into the model. CP1, 2, and 3 stand for “little,” “some,” and 
“significant” impact on the probability of a wrong-type blood 
transfusion occurring. S2 is the second highest safeguard 
category, indicating a formalized, built-in double-check step during 
the process.  S5 is the lowest safeguard category, indicating that 
the error cannot be detected once it has occurred.
This body of nodes represents the generic matrix pattern developed for transferring 
data from existing FMECAs to new influence diagrams and Bayesian Networks. An 
influence diagram differs from a BN because it includes decision nodes.
The complete influence diagram 
at left has five decision nodes.  
These decision nodes allow the 
program to “decide” what the best 
course of action is to ensure that 
no adverse events occur. The 
program indicates that orders 
should never be faxed. Computer 
orders are far more reliable.  
Additionally, physicians should 
never rely on verbal orders for 
transfusions.  They should always 
use an MD order sheet.  The 
entire series of 2.0 steps can be 
eliminated.
After eliminating all event chains 
with a higher probability of error, a 
streamlined BN remains.  This BN 
can be used to determine which 
combinations of error are most 
likely to result in particular 
consequences.  The more critical 
errors can then be addressed in a 
prioritized order that takes into 
account the possibility of multiple 
errors leading to adverse events.
A Note on Bayesian Networks and Bayes’ Theorem: Bayesian Networks are driven by calculations based on Bayes’ Theorem.  The Theorem relates the  “prior” 
probability (a priori, also called the “direct” probability) of a hypothesis, conditional upon certain evidence, PE (H), to the “posterior” probability (a posteriori, also called 
the “inverse” probability) of the evidence, conditional upon the hypothesis, PH (E).
PE (H) = [ P(H) / P(E) ] PH (E)
BNs’ calculations of posterior probabilities make them useful in diagnosing causal relationships.  For example, Bayesian Network models have been used to 
successfully diagnose which pathogens cause ventilator-associated pneumonia, which patients have acute appendicitis, and which patients are eligible for asthma 
guideline treatment. BNs have also been used to assess the reliability of processes.
